安全修复(P0): - 移除硬编码的 OAuth client_secret(Antigravity、Gemini CLI), 改为通过环境变量注入(ANTIGRAVITY_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET、 GEMINI_CLI_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET) - 新增 logredact.RedactText() 对非结构化文本做敏感信息脱敏, 覆盖 GOCSPX-*/AIza* 令牌和常见 key=value 模式 - 日志中不再打印 org_uuid、account_uuid、email_address 等敏感值 安全修复(P1): - URL 验证增强:新增 ValidateHTTPURL 统一入口,支持 allowlist 和 私网地址阻断(localhost/内网 IP) - 代理回退安全:代理初始化失败时默认阻止直连回退,防止 IP 泄露, 可通过 security.proxy_fallback.allow_direct_on_error 显式开启 - Gemini OAuth 配置校验:client_id 与 client_secret 必须同时 设置或同时留空 其他改进: - 新增 tools/secret_scan.py 密钥扫描工具和 Makefile secret-scan 目标 - 更新所有 docker-compose 和部署配置,传递 OAuth secret 环境变量 - google_one OAuth 类型使用固定 redirectURI,与 code_assist 对齐 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
176 lines
4.7 KiB
Go
176 lines
4.7 KiB
Go
package urlvalidator
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/url"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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type ValidationOptions struct {
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AllowedHosts []string
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RequireAllowlist bool
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AllowPrivate bool
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}
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// ValidateHTTPURL validates an outbound HTTP/HTTPS URL.
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//
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// It provides a single validation entry point that supports:
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// - scheme 校验(https 或可选允许 http)
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// - 可选 allowlist(支持 *.example.com 通配)
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// - allow_private_hosts 策略(阻断 localhost/私网字面量 IP)
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//
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// 注意:DNS Rebinding 防护(解析后 IP 校验)应在实际发起请求时执行,避免 TOCTOU。
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func ValidateHTTPURL(raw string, allowInsecureHTTP bool, opts ValidationOptions) (string, error) {
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trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
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if trimmed == "" {
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return "", errors.New("url is required")
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}
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parsed, err := url.Parse(trimmed)
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if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url: %s", trimmed)
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}
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scheme := strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme)
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if scheme != "https" && (!allowInsecureHTTP || scheme != "http") {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url scheme: %s", parsed.Scheme)
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}
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host := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parsed.Hostname()))
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if host == "" {
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return "", errors.New("invalid host")
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}
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if !opts.AllowPrivate && isBlockedHost(host) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("host is not allowed: %s", host)
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}
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if port := parsed.Port(); port != "" {
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num, err := strconv.Atoi(port)
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if err != nil || num <= 0 || num > 65535 {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid port: %s", port)
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}
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}
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allowlist := normalizeAllowlist(opts.AllowedHosts)
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if opts.RequireAllowlist && len(allowlist) == 0 {
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return "", errors.New("allowlist is not configured")
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}
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if len(allowlist) > 0 && !isAllowedHost(host, allowlist) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("host is not allowed: %s", host)
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}
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parsed.Path = strings.TrimRight(parsed.Path, "/")
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parsed.RawPath = ""
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return strings.TrimRight(parsed.String(), "/"), nil
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}
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func ValidateURLFormat(raw string, allowInsecureHTTP bool) (string, error) {
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// 最小格式校验:仅保证 URL 可解析且 scheme 合规,不做白名单/私网/SSRF 校验
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trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
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if trimmed == "" {
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return "", errors.New("url is required")
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}
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parsed, err := url.Parse(trimmed)
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if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url: %s", trimmed)
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}
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scheme := strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme)
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if scheme != "https" && (!allowInsecureHTTP || scheme != "http") {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url scheme: %s", parsed.Scheme)
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}
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host := strings.TrimSpace(parsed.Hostname())
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if host == "" {
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return "", errors.New("invalid host")
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}
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if port := parsed.Port(); port != "" {
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num, err := strconv.Atoi(port)
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if err != nil || num <= 0 || num > 65535 {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid port: %s", port)
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}
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}
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return strings.TrimRight(trimmed, "/"), nil
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}
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func ValidateHTTPSURL(raw string, opts ValidationOptions) (string, error) {
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return ValidateHTTPURL(raw, false, opts)
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}
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// ValidateResolvedIP 验证 DNS 解析后的 IP 地址是否安全
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// 用于防止 DNS Rebinding 攻击:在实际 HTTP 请求时调用此函数验证解析后的 IP
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func ValidateResolvedIP(host string) error {
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("dns resolution failed: %w", err)
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}
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for _, ip := range ips {
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if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
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ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified() {
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return fmt.Errorf("resolved ip %s is not allowed", ip.String())
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func normalizeAllowlist(values []string) []string {
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if len(values) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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normalized := make([]string, 0, len(values))
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for _, v := range values {
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entry := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(v))
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if entry == "" {
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continue
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}
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if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(entry); err == nil {
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entry = host
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}
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normalized = append(normalized, entry)
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}
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return normalized
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}
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func isAllowedHost(host string, allowlist []string) bool {
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for _, entry := range allowlist {
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if entry == "" {
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continue
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(entry, "*.") {
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suffix := strings.TrimPrefix(entry, "*.")
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if host == suffix || strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+suffix) {
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return true
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}
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continue
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}
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if host == entry {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func isBlockedHost(host string) bool {
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if host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".localhost") {
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return true
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}
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if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
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if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified() {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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